By Arthur Schopenhauer
Quantity 1 of the definitive English translation of 1 of crucial philosophical works of the nineteenth century, the elemental assertion in a single very important move of post-Kantian concept. Corrects approximately 1,000 mistakes and omissions within the older Haldane-Kemp translation. For the 1st time, this version interprets and locates all fees and offers complete index.
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And Moore admits succumbing to this discomfort. Old habits die hard. By the end of the lecture, Moore was still not converted: ‘Wittgenstein has not succeeded in removing the “uncomfortable feeling” which it gives me to be told that “3 ϩ 3 ϭ 6” and “( p ʛ q . p) entails q” are neither true nor false’ (MWL 81). However Moore may have taken Wittgenstein’s ‘puzzling assertion that 3ϩ 3 ϭ 6 (and all rules of deduction, similarly) is neither true nor false’ (MWL 80), there is no ambiguity about Wittgenstein’s ‘declaration’ and ‘insistence’ that mathematical ‘propositions’ are ‘rules’, indeed ‘rules of grammar’ (MWL 79) and that these ‘rules’ are ‘neither true nor false’ (MWL 62, 73).
Von Wright notes: Wittgenstein is here pointing to an important conceptual difference between belief and knowledge. In order to establish that I believe that p, I need not give grounds for thinking p true. But in order to vindicate a claim to knowledge, grounds must normally be provided, that is, we must be able to tell, how we know this. (1982, 269) The superfluity of grounds in the case of belief would then take care of the underived and unjustified, aspect of the assurance under examination here.
Morawetz: It is important to distinguish the correct view that I cannot know (or have known) anything that is false from the absurd view that I cannot claim to know, or give grounds for, anything that is false. Claiming to believe differs from claiming to know in that the latter, but not the former, is a commitment to give grounds. (1978, 86) All empirical knowledge claims, however well grounded, are susceptible of doubt by others and indeed of subsequent doubt by oneself. And if the claim that ‘I know p’ does not, as traditionally assumed, always entail p, the claim to knowledge hardly differs from the claim to certainty: ‘know’ is then indeed ‘just as subjective’ as being certain (OC 415).