Personal Value by Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen

By Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen

Sure issues, like justice, have impersonal worth. different issues, like your mom and dad, hold own values: they've got worth for you. in addition to no matter what price they've got, they're necessary to you. The philosophical literature in addition to non-philosophical literature is inundated with feedback concerning the types of factor which are strong for us or, whether it is a unfavorable own worth, what's undesirable for us. it is a stimulating and vibrant region of philosophical study, however it has tended to monopolize the idea of 'good-for', linking it unavoidably to welfare or health and wellbeing. on the grounds that those roughly well-grounded items of recommendation are seldom observed via an research of the suggestion of 'good-for', there's a want for such an research. Ronnow-Rasmussen treatments this desire, by way of providing a singular approach of reading the concept of non-public worth. He defends the concept now we have cause to extend our classical worth taxonomy with those own values. through fine-tuning a trend of worth research which has roots within the writings of the Austrian thinker Franz Bretano, this kind of research will come to hide own values, too. additionally, Ronnow-Rasmussen makes huge contributions to a few matters, together with hedonism vs. preferentialism, subjectivism vs. objectivism, worth bearer monism vs. worth bearer pluralism, and the inaccurate form of cause challenge -- all of that are a lot debated between present day price theorists.

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What determines whether a value is intrinsic or extrinsic is, in the end, the nature and scope of the supervenience base. Moreover, her suggestion is not obviously consistent with the pattern of value analysis that I employ. It should be stressed, though, that there is a sense in which my aim here concerns only indirectly final values. My main concern in this book is to discuss the extent to which some version of the FA analysis, if true, is helpful when it comes to understanding personal values.

Other names sometimes mentioned in this context include Adam Smith (1759/1790) and Henry Sidgwick (1907 [1874]). 4 Brentano (1969 [1889], p. 18). 5 Brentano conceived of this higher mode as an emotive state. But taking pleasure in something is not necessarily being in an emotive state. In fact in recent years Fred Feldman has objected to what he refers to as the “distinctive feeling view”: the idea that pleasures are phenomenologically uniform; see his Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (2004).

What the subjectivist refers to as the constitution of value is nothing but itself a supervenient feature. When the subjectivist claims that an object x is valuable, and that x’s value is constituted by the subject’s attitude, the constitutive attitude in question is really part of something else that is valuable— namely, the subject’s direction of a certain attitude on x. It is this obtaining of a state of affairs rather than x that is valuable. Since the attitude is in a sense part of the value bearer, it is more appropriate to regard it as a value-making, subjacent feature.

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