By Jason Stanley
Jason Stanley provides a startling and provocative declare approximately wisdom: that even if an individual is familiar with a proposition at a given time is partially made up our minds through his or her sensible pursuits, i.e. through how a lot is at stake for that individual at the moment. In protecting this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a couple of techniques for resolving philosophical paradox, making the publication crucial not only for experts in epistemology yet for all philosophers drawn to philosophical method. considering that a couple of his suggestions attract linguistic facts, will probably be of serious curiosity to linguists to boot.
Read or Download Knowledge and Practical Interests (Lines of Thought) PDF
Similar epistemology books
Internalism and Epistemology is a robust articulation and protection of a classical resolution to a permanent query: what's the nature of rational trust? against winning philosophical model, the e-book argues that epistemic externalism leads, not only to skepticism, yet to epistemic nihilism - the denial of the very hazard of justification.
The philosophical concerns raised through notion make it one of many principal issues within the philosophical culture. Debate concerning the nature of perceptual wisdom and the items of belief contains a thread that runs during the historical past of philosophy. In a few historic classes the main matters were predominantly epistemological and concerning scepticism, yet an enough knowing of notion is necessary extra generally, specially for metaphysics and the philosophy of brain.
Franz Brentano 1 was once a big thinker, yet for a very long time his value used to be under-estimated. a minimum of within the English talking nations, he got here to be remembered top because the initiator of a philoso phical place which he in reality deserted for reliable and adequate 2 purposes. His final and most crucial contributions handed nearly omitted.
A few imagine that concerns to do with medical procedure are final century's stale debate; Popper used to be an recommend of technique, yet Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are speculated to have introduced the talk approximately its prestige to an finish. The papers during this quantity express that matters in technique are nonetheless greatly alive.
- The Theory of Knowledge
- Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception
- Why Things Matter: The Place of Values in Science, Psychoanalysis and Religion
- The concept of model. An introduction to the materialist epistemology of mathematics
Additional info for Knowledge and Practical Interests (Lines of Thought)
3 It appears that the use of 'really' when it occurs with knowledge ascriptions ('I don't really know that . . ' ) is a hedge, in Paul Kay's sense. A hedge is some expression the linguistic function of which is to comment on the appropriateness of asserting the embedded sentence (as in uses of metalinguistic negation such as 'John isn't happy, he's ecstatic'). One such hedge, according to Kay, is the expression 'literally speaking', as in 'Literally speaking, that is pure water'. The occurrence of'really' in knowledge ascriptions appears to be a hedge in this sense—in so using 'really', one concedes the infelicity of asserting that one knows the proposition in question.
I do not read DeRose (2004) as rejecting Claim 2, since his target there is the more restrictive claim that it is only the speaker's intentions that do the semantic work. Contextualism ~ 27 The conclusion follows from the first three premises. So this argument is certainly valid, and it appears to have no easily disputable premise. However, if skeptical arguments are sound, then it appears that they undermine ordinary claims to know. The standard contextualist's reaction to skeptical arguments is to try to explain away the threat posed by skeptical arguments to the truth of ordinary knowledge ascriptions.
DeRose 1995; Lewis 1996). There are problems with all extant proposals. But, since there is no good account of these matters for uncontroversial context-sensitive expressions, perhaps the contextualist is not in a worse situation than the rest of us. If the contextualist can show that the shifts she requires over a discourse for her explanations of the data from lower-standards knowledge properties to higher-standards knowledge properties occur in a similar pattern to shifts in content with other contextsensitive expressions (say, from one standard of tallness to another), she has fulfilled her obligations.