By Earl Conee, Richard Feldman
Evidentialism is a concept of information whose essence is the conventional concept that the justification of authentic wisdom is solely an issue of proof. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman current the definitive exposition and defence of this much-contested idea. They argue that evidentialism is an asset nearly far and wide in epistemology, from getting all started legitimately to refuting skepticism. the quantity collects the authors' well known paintings at the subject and provides huge new fabric, making it the best source in evidentialism for all epistemologists.
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Additional info for Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology
The example illustrates the general point that the cases that support the foundationalist approach do not really show that foundational experiences can justify external world beliefs in the absence of coherence with other beliefs. More generally, when one approach is supported by a case, the other approach is not threatened. In order for a theory to capture all that is right about both coherentism and foundationalism, it must imply that both coherence with some system of belief and a foundation in experience are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for the justification of a belief.
If we add to these sensible qualifications two other broadening conditions that have been advocated above, the resulting reading of the principle allows a person's justification to include all of the defended external elements. We need add only that the premises may assert "beliefs" in a sense in which all experiencing is believing, and that the "argument" may support a justified belief in virtue of an epistemic relation beyond deductive and inductive validity. The resulting reading of the principle allows that a justification is not regarded as such and not otherwise epistemically appreciated.
This terminology is far from completely clear. 12 What is not obvious is the exact nature of the constraint. , ibid. See note 6 above for a suggestion regarding how sensory awareness might take propositional objects. This possibility requires a revision in Williams's argument, since the suggestion gives experiences the right sort of ontological status to serve as premises. It is likely that Williams would contend that the given cannot be propositional in structure. He seems to think that propositional thought is "conceptualized," and that it follows directly that it is not merely given.