By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This booklet proposes an unique concept of epistemic justification that provides a brand new technique to relate justification to the epistemic objective of truth-conducive trust. the idea is predicated on a singular research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a fashion of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation needn't be justificatory while systemic deception can be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification has to be obtainable to the believer, whereas preserving the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research exhibits how justification pertains to, yet is special from, facts, rationality, and likelihood. It presents a unifying therapy of matters crucial to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the influence of success on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical assessment of epistemological theories. There are additional functions to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technological know-how, and ethics.
The ebook will interact philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Additional info for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
2 Then, strictly, it will be possible to use the method without generating false beliefs. But this approach proves unacceptable, for a number of reasons. Some reasons will emerge in subsequent chapters (especially Chapter 6). The immediate objection is that however improbable this approach renders the generation of any particular false belief, the avoidance of falsity altogether becomes an overwhelmingly improbable accident. While infallibility cannot be expected of it, a justificatory method should be error-resistant, not just in the sense that errors are few but in the sense that they are, taken individually, resisted.
But explanations are not, in general, justificatory. 3 Difficulties with Deontology What is worse, deontological concepts like blamelessness, compliance with norms, and the fulfillment of duty are ultimately incapable of supporting definitive judgments as to the justifiedness of belief. The problem is that there are different respects in which such deontological standards may apply to justification, and one may meet these standards in one respect while violating them in another. To see this, let us ask whether the sincere, reflective conviction that one believes blamelessly, by any standard that it would be reasonable to impose, is inerrant.
The method is nevertheless reliable, as the region is abnormal. Notice, again, that its abnormality is not simply a matter of frequency. 5 One might nevertheless protest that frequency has a lot to do with it. The abnormality of fake barns depends on how prevalent are facades in relation to real barns, and how widespread is the mixture. Is it not arbitrary at what point deceptive conditions become normal? But if the division between normal and abnormal conditions is unclear, so is reliability. I do not think that these questions are the right response.